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ARBITRATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT

GRIEVANCES: A REPRESENTATION DILEmMA
FOR UNIONS

Reginald Alleynet
In a period of little over fifty years, labor unions have used the labor
arbitration forum for thousands of employee grievances over alleged
violations of governing collective bargaining agreements.1 Most of these
have involved discharge and discipline matters, disputes over economic
wage rates and pay, and seniority grievances.2 Although the subject matter
and fact patterns of arbitrated grievances vary widely,3 private sector
grievances share one attribute: they deal with subjects not generally found
on state and federal court dockets, in that neither state common law nor
statutory law includes typical collective bargaining agreement topics. The
enactment of federal and state antidiscrimination statutes is beginning to
erode the separation of grievance arbitration issues from traditional
courtroom disputes. Collective bargaining agreements are now written to
parallel some statutory language, particularly antidiscrimination clauses.
A new problem associated with this trend is that the arbitrator who
interprets one of these clauses must consider the extent to which the statute
should govern how the parallel clause in the collective bargaining
agreement is to be interpreted. 4 The issue has divided arbitrators, courts,
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1. See generally EDWIN E. WrITE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION 1
(1952); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American LaborArbitration: The Maturing
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557 (1983).
2. See, e.g., 1997 FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 38.
3. See id.
4. See LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK

61 (1994) (noting that the range of possible interpretations is narrower than it first appears).
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and commentators.
Collective bargaining agreement clauses banning discrimination,
especially sex discrimination, create a unique problem for unions in their
joint administration of the agreements. Outside the context of collective
bargaining, the association of labor arbitration with sexual harassment
claims fosters an image of grievances filed by women claiming to be
victims of sexual harassment. However, sexual harassment grievances in
labor arbitration overwhelmingly involve men challenging disciplinary
action or discharge for sexual harassment conduct. This presents a public
relations dilemma for unions. It also generates ill-will among unionrepresented female employees toward their male counterparts-female
employees probably wonder why their unions champion the cause of
accused harassers while doing little for those making claims as sexual
harassment victims. 5 While unions use the grievance arbitration process to
defend accused sexual harassment perpetrators, they provide almost no
grievance arbitration assistance for alleged harassment victims. This
creates the 6perception that unions are insensitive to the interests of female
employees.
Why do fewer victims than aggressors bring their claims to the labor
arbitration forum? Is it male-dominated union leadership? Is it the
language of collective bargaining agreements? Perhaps it is the result of
efforts to avoid inter-employee conflict within bargaining units. Perhaps
the low number of victim-based arbitrated grievance claims is due to
inadequate labor arbitration remedies for sexual harassment victims. The
explanation appears to be a combination of all of these possibilities.
In the union-represented workplace, adjudication of sexual harassment
claims brings together an accused perpetrator and an alleged victim, both of
whom are sometimes represented by the same union, regardless of whether
the two employees are in the same or a different bargaining unit. In that
Neither the incorporation of external law in the collective bargaining agreement nor the
arbitrator's use of external law as an aid in the interpretation of the agreement is an
important issue. The real dispute is whether, and when, an arbitrator may use external law
instead of the terms of the agreement. See id. Cooper and Nolan believe that the arbitrator
should use Title VII law only as an aid in interpreting the agreement's sex discriminatidn
clause, putting aside the issue of whether such a clause should be interpreted to include
sexual harassment. See id.; Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Cases: An EmpiricalStudy, 1976 PROC. TWENTY-EIGHTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARD.
59.
5. See Rochelle Sharpe, Divided Ranks: Women at MitsubishiSay Union Fell Short on
Sexual Harassment,WALL ST. J., July 10, 1996, at Al.
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers sexual harassment claims brought
by males against females. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 681-82 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has ruled that Title VII also
covers same-sex claims. See BVP Management Assocs. v. Fredette, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998),
denying cert. to Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
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setting, the conflict between the two union members generates competing
representation obligations for the union in its effort to represent both sides
fairly. How the conflict is resolved depends initially on the types of sexual
harassment provisions, if any, the collective bargaining agreement
provides.
I.

EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT

A grievance arbitration conflict between two opposing parties in a
sexual harassment claim is less likely to arise if the governing collective
bargaining agreement does not contain a clause explicitly prohibiting
sexual harassment.7 Many recent collective bargaining agreements do,
however, contain general discrimination clauses-almost all of which
include sex discrimination.'
These clauses can be used to force an alleged harassment victim to
arbitrate her claim, because a sex discrimination clause may be interpreted
to include sexual harassment. This interpretation parallels the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to include sexual
harassment. 9
On the other hand, it is certainly arguable that a clause in a collective
bargaining agreement need not be interpreted in the same manner that
7. See BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS (14th ed. 1995), which provides a
statistical breakdown of the kinds of clauses found in collective bargaining agreements,
including the percentage of agreements containing a particular clause. Basic Patternsdoes
not include sexual harassment in its list of categories covered by collective bargaining
agreements. Some agreements include them, but their numbers are apparently too small to
register as statistically significant.
8. Discharge and discipline clauses are present in 98% of collective bargaining
agreements. See id. at 7. Specific grounds for discharge are present in 82%. See id. Sexual
harassment is not listed as a ground for discharge in any of the 400 collective bargaining
agreements selected for the Basic Patternscompilation. See id. Antidiscrimination clauses
covering race, sex, color, creed, national origin, and age are found in 87% of agreements.
See id. at 127.
9. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritorheld that Title VII's
ban against sex discrimination includes a sexual harassment ban, even when the harassment
did not result in the loss of a job or income. Lower courts had divided over the issue by
treating workplace sexual harassment as not being work related. See Come v. Bausch &
Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); see also Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp.
233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Some courts do not characterize sexual harassment as sex
discrimination because the sex roles could have been reversed. See Come, 390 F. Supp. at
161. Moreover, some courts consider sexual harassment a cause of action properly pursued
as a personal injury tort under state law. See Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422
F. Supp. 553 (N.J. 1976). In Come, the court further held that the alleged harassing conduct
did not benefit the employer and therefore could not be a cause of action under the federal
statute. See Come, 390 F. Supp. at 161. The pioneering work advocating sexual harassment
as a cause of action under statutory and constitutional law is CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
SExUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
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courts interpret comparable statutory language. 10 Even though sex
discrimination clauses in collective bargaining agreements are now
common, there are few published labor arbitration decisions about victims'
harassment grievances. 1 The absence of explicit collective bargaining
agreement language concerning sexual harassment is at least a partial
explanation for the dearth of victim-based sexual harassment grievances.
This leaves open the independent question, not itself directly treated in this
Article, of whether unions should seek to press for the inclusion of sexual
harassment clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
A.

Inter-Employee Conflict

Lurking here are a union's legitimate concerns about inter-employee
conflicts which have the potential to deleteriously affect the union's ability
to represent employees. The conflict arises when sexual harassment claims
embrace bargaining unit members who are alleged harassment victims and
bargaining unit members who are accused harassers. The dimensions of
the problem may be illustrated with two related hypothetical scenarios.
Assume that a collective bargaining agreement contains a clause
prohibiting sexual harassment. Also, assume that the agreement contains a
clause prohibiting discipline and discharge except for just cause. Mary
files a grievance alleging a violation of the agreement's sexual harassment
clause, asserting that "Joe sexually harassed me, continues to do so, and the
company refuses to do anything about it." Her union takes the grievance to
arbitration and wins. The company compensates Mary and fires Joe, who
then files a grievance contending that he was discharged without just cause.
What should the union do? If it takes Joe's grievance to arbitration, the
company will point to the arbitrator's award and argue that a decision
sustaining Joe's grievance would conflict with the arbitrator's decision in
Mary's 12case. This is a conflict that an arbitrator would find difficult to
ignore.
In the second hypothetical, suppose that Joe is immediately discharged
because of Mary's sexual harassment allegations. Joe then files a
grievance over his discharge and, simultaneously, Mary files a grievance
claiming sexual harassment by Joe. Now the union's dilemma deepens.
One determinative issue is common to both grievances: did Joe sexually

10. See Tim Bornstein, Arbitration of Sexual Harassment,1991 PRoc. FORTY-FOURTH
ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 109, 110-14 (stating the argument in favor of using
federal law to interpret the word "sex" in a collective bargaining agreement's sexual
discrimination clause).
11. See BASIC PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, supra note 7.
12. See Timothy J. Heinsz, Grieve It Again: Of Stare Decisis, Res Judicata and
CollateralEstoppel in LaborArbitration,38 B.C. L. REv. 275 (1997).
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harass Mary? Taking both grievances to arbitration would itself generate
irreconcilable conflict. The union's dilemma is further compounded by the
possibility of lawsuits against it for refusing to take either grievance to
arbitration. If, in good faith, the union refused to take Mary's sexual
harassment grievance to arbitration, she might file a breach of the duty of
fair representation claim against the union. If, in good faith, the union
refused to take Joe's case to arbitration, Joe might then sue the union for
breach of the duty of fair representation.13 Although it is unlikely the union
would lose both duty of fair representation cases, it would have to expend
considerable resources to defend against one or both.
If a collective bargaining agreement addresses victim-based sexual
harassment, a union could not conscientiously resolve the conflict by
refusing to take any accused harasser's discipline or discharge case to
arbitration. Nor could a union appropriately take all alleged harassment
victims' grievances to arbitration on the sometimes advanced assumption
that all accusations of sexual harassment are valid, because the claimant
would not otherwise suffer the burdens associated with prosecution of the
claim. 14 If resolution of the potential conflict exists, it lies somewhere
between these two unacceptable polar extremes.
II.

REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS

Collective bargaining agreement provisions are generally not those for
which large sums of money are awarded when the agreement is found to
have been breached." Consequently, this feature, together with long13. See generally LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A
COURSEBOOK DEFINING THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION 38 (1994).
14. See MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 27 n.12 (noting that making sexual harassment
claims risks the very employment consequences which sanctioned the advances in the first
place). Professor MacKinnon's book no doubt influenced the Supreme Court's Meritor
decision to include sexual harassment within Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination.
The development of sexual harassment law since 1979 might have made it comparatively
less burdensome to protest sexual harassment. At least now there is a remedy. However,
one remaining difficult question is whether, with the stakes being higher for the employer
accused of having unlawfully condoned sexual harassment, any victim's burden-reducing
support from Title VIl's presence might be matched or overcome by the victim's perception
of how her employer might react to an accusation of unlawful conduct.
15. See MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 4-8
(2d ed. 1990). Hill and Sinicropi noted authority for the view that it is "improper to
measure an [arbitrator's] award as if it were the kind of damage judgment which the courts
would render." Id. at 6 (quoting David Feller, Remedies in Arbitration, 1964 PROC.
SEVENTEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 193). Feller's article argues that
arbitrators should award remedies on the basis of what the collective bargaining agreement
authorizes and that if the agreement is silent on remedial authority, the remedy should
follow the common law of industrial relations and the kinds of remedies customarily
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standing tradition and practice, limits labor arbitration monetary remedies
to easily calculated, sum-certain, make-whole amounts.1 6 The victim-based
sexual harassment grievance does not fit that common category of
grievance. Given the grievous harm so often suffered by victims of sexual
harassment, a cease and desist order alone would often be inadequate. It
would certainly be inadequate as compared with what a judge or jury might
award in a comparable Title VII case, 17 except in those cases where very
minor harassing conduct has taken place. Punitive damages are virtually
unheard of in labor arbitration cases,"' as are damages for pain and
suffering and for emotional distress.' 9 Labor arbitrators are still uncertain
whether interest should be awarded on back pay. 20 In addition, a labor
arbitrator may be reluctant to find that an employer engaged in conduct
prohibited by a federal or state statute, in addition to having breached the

collective bargaining agreement.
Because labor arbitration proceedings are geared toward the resolution
of relatively minor disputes, virtually no formal discovery beyond the
production of documents exists. Additionally, formal rules of evidence are
generally not applicable.
In contrast, contested sexual harassment
allegations often raise complex, emotional issues. For example, credibility
issues may arise when liability and damages are determined.
The
procedural informality of labor arbitration, together with the burden of
proof that a union must satisfy in a victim-based sexual harassment

proceeding, would
harassment.22

disadvantage

the grievant who alleges

sexual

provided in collective bargaining agreements or by arbitrators. See id. at 132. Other
arbitrators, as cited by Hill and Sinicropi, equate the arbitrator's remedial power with that of
a court in a breach-of-contract dispute. See HILL & SINICROPI, supra, at 4.
16. See generally HILL & SINICRoPI, supra note 15.
17. The average jury award in a sexual harassment case appears to be $250,000. See
Elizabeth Larson, Flirtingwith DangerousPrecedents, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1996, at A12.
18. See HiLL & SmNCROPI, supra note 15, at 436-47. A consensus rationale among
labor arbitrators, as summarized by Hill and Sinicropi, appears to be that the nature of the
ongoing joint relationship would suffer if punitive damages were permitted, and that too
much power would be conferred on the arbitrator authorized to award punitive damages
who, at the same time, remains insulated from judicial review.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 450-60. Notwithstanding the decisions in favor of awarding interest on
awards of back pay and other benefits, decisions to the contrary continue to be the norm.
See id. at 458.
21. See id. at 3-5.
22. The settled procedural rule in labor arbitration hearings is that the union bears the
burden of proof for all grievances except those involving discipline or discharge. See id. at
41. In a grievance involving an accused harasser, the employer would thus bear the burden
of proof. In a grievance brought by an alleged victim (a non-discipline case), the burden of
proof would be on the union. Consequently, if the evidence in a labor arbitration case were
balanced evenly, the alleged harassment victim should lose and the accused perpetrator
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In a recent arbitration decision, Boone County Board of Education v.
Boone County EducationalAssociation, 3 an arbitrator interpreted one of
the now rare but possibly increasing number of collective bargaining
agreement clauses explicitly prohibiting sexual harassment. The clause
provided that "[tlhe Board and the Association shall foster a work
environment free of hostile, demeaning, intimidating or harassing behavior,
including sexual harassment as those terms are defined in law." 24
Harassment was an issue in this case, though not sexual harassment.
A school teacher claimed that her school's principal criticized her work
performance with a loud and intimidating voice that others could have
heard. The teacher testified that she felt threatened by the physical setting
and the manner in which she was addressed; that the principal's demeanor
was aggressive, antagonizing, and intimidating; and that she was
humiliated, shocked, and fearful. She also contended that the harassment
caused her to weep. The arbitrator sustained the grievance but limited the
awarded remedy to a finding that the principal violated the collective
bargaining agreement by fostering a work environment which was not "free
of hostile, demeaning, intimidating or harassing behavior.., as those terms
are defined in law." 5 The arbitrator awarded the grievant no money and
did not provide a formal cease and desist order. The union had somewhat
vaguely asked the arbitrator for an appropriate remedy. The absence of an
available and easily applied make-whole formula, from which a specific
sum could be derived, may have been the basis for the arbitrator's penniless
remedy.
So firmly established is the labor arbitration practice of awarding no
more than sum-certain, make-whole amounts, that not even a collective
bargaining clause adopting statutory standards for discrimination
grievances would likely change the practice. For example, in a dispute
over the interpretation of a clause prohibiting sexual discrimination as
provided by law, an arbitrator opined:
That brief phrase [as provided by law] is too slender a reed on
which to rest a theory of full incorporation. While agreeing to
prohibit sex discrimination, and thus to arbitrate grievances
alleging sex discrimination, the Company did not necessarily
mean to vest arbitrators with the power to award compensatory
and punitive damages that are virtually unknown in labor
arbitration. 26

should win. The outcome would be similar in a judicial proceeding, where the burden of
proof generally lies with the moving party plaintiff.
23. 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. 03NA) 118 (1996) (Wren, Arb.).
24. Id. at 118.
25. Id.
26. Union Camp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Local 1692, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep.
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So comparatively weak are the remedies available to sexual
harassment victims in the labor arbitration forum, that it may not only be in
the best interests of unions, but also in the best interests of harassment
victims, that unions not pursue their claims of serious sexual harassment in
the labor arbitration forum unless the sexual harassment victim has lost her
job or some other employment benefit as a consequence of the harassment.
If the victim lost her job or some employment benefit due to harassment,
the victim's remedial interests would fall within the class of employees
whose grievances contest discipline and discharge or other conditions of
employment as violations of the collective bargaining agreement.
These cases arise in a number of contexts. The most prominent type
of case may be the harassment-related constructive discharge. In a
constructive discharge, a victim of either hostile environment or quid pro
quo sexual harassment is disciplined or discharged as a direct consequence
of the harassment. Over the past several years courts have interpreted
constructive discharge cases to include those discharges that appear to be
voluntary resignations but are actually the consequence of unlawfully
motivated treatment on the job. 27 Unions are now taking some harassmentbased constructive discharge cases to arbitration and winning.28 Discharges
so motivated are unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429
and also breach the collective bargaining agreement's just cause clause.30
The case for avoiding the kinds of conflicts exemplified by the Mary-Joe
hypothetical scenarios is further strengthened when one considers the
limited scope of labor arbitration remedies for sexual harassment and the
consequences of the labor arbitration forum's informality.
(BNA) 295 (1995) (Nolan, Arb.). The arbitrator also said that there is a strong argument
that mental distress damages should never be awarded. See id. (citing HILL & SunCROPI,
supra note 15).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e3(a) (1994).
28. See, e.g., Oakland Unified Sch. Dist. v. Oakland Sch. Employees Ass'n, 81 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1237 (1983) (Griffin, Arb.). There is a class of cases falling somewhat
between constructive discharge and real discharge cases. This class includes cases in which
an employee does not quit but is discharged for poor work performance. Arbitrators will
sustain a grievance when it is established that the work performance was poor for reasons
related to sexual harassment. See, e.g., Exxon Co. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers
Union, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 846 (1995) (Caraway, Arb.).
29. See Blake v. C & A Gitto, Inc., No. 4:96CV161-DJS, 1998 WL 47 DLR A-3 (E. D.
Mo. Mar. 3, 1998) (federal court upholding a $257,000 jury award for a waitress whose
supervisor's harassment made her work so intolerable that she was forced to quit her job).
30. See, e.g., Rodeway Inn v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 2, 102 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1003 (1994). In Rodeway, a hotel housekeeper was discharged for discussing
with other hotel employees the hotel owner's alleged sexual harassment of her. The
arbitrator awarded back pay but no reinstatement because of the volatile relationship
between the owner and the grievant. See also 1TT Fed. Servs. Corp. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters Local 959, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289 (1995) (Landau, Arb.) (no retaliation
found).
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Potentialfor Union-Employer Collusion

This Article has so far assumed that unions have a genuine interest in
the welfare of both alleged harassment victims and alleged harassment
perpetrators. The assumption is valid when applied to most labor unions.
This assumption, however, may not apply to every union. Some unions
may be more interested in protecting the interests of white males, who may
comprise the bulk of the bargaining unit, against sexual harassment
allegations.
The Supreme Court was contemplating union-employer
collusion in general discrimination cases,31 when it made the following
statement in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver:
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the
manner and extent to which an individual grievance is
presented.... In arbitration, as in the collective bargaining
process, the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit.... Moreover, harmony of interest between the
union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed,
especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made....
And a breach of the union's duty of fair representation may prove
difficult to establish.... In this respect, it is noteworthy that
Congress thought it necessary to afford the protections of Title
VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] against unions as well as
employers. 32

31. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
32. Id. at 58 n.19 (citations omitted). This clear warning about the potential for unionemployer collusion in arbitration cases involving allegations of racial discrimination is, in
this author's view, the dominant rationale for the holding in Gardner-Denver. The case
holds that a statutory discrimination claim should not be dismissed from federal court solely
because the plaintiff lost a prior arbitration grievance involving the same allegations of
discrimination. The collusion rationale distinguishes Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), which involved no union, and hence, no possibility of unionemployer collusion. See also David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory
DiscriminationClaims Undera Collective BargainingAgreement: The Odd Case of Caesar
Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 53 (1998). This article was published after the Supreme
Court decided Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998). In
Wright, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order to be effective, a collective bargaining
agreement's waiver of an employee's right to judicial relief for a statutory claim had to be
clear and unmistakable. The Court did not decide, as many had expected it to decide,
whether such a waiver is enforceable. Professor Feller's views were incorporated in a
Wright case amicus brief written by Professor Feller for the National Academy of
Arbitrators. See Brief of the National Academy of Arbitrators as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Wright v. Universal MaritimeServ. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998) (No. 97-889),
availablein 1998 WL 221374. Professor Feller argues that the Supreme Court should reject
the collusion rationale of Gardner-Denverand adopt his view that the arbitration clause at
issue in the Wright case did not include a "clear and unmistakable waiver." Wright, 119 S.
Ct. at 397.
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The Gardner-Denver case was decided in 1974, before sexual
harassment was considered sexual discrimination that violated Title VII.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's language on the potential for unionemployer collusion in the arbitration of racial discrimination grievances
would likely be employed by the Court in a sexual harassment context. For
A female
example, consider the following hypothetical scenario.
employee, W, in a male-dominated and newly sex-integrated bargaining
unit, files a grievance alleging sexual harassment by a male member of the
bargaining unit. The union, sympathetic to the workplace values of its
predominantly male constituency, is reluctant to take her grievance to
arbitration. However, the union is also reluctant to face a breach of the
duty of fair representation lawsuit. It believes, with good reason, that W
will file one if the union refuses to invoke arbitration for her. Faced with
these conflicting considerations, the union does the one thing that will
avoid the lawsuit and also satisfy its male constituents. It takes W's case to
arbitration with insufficient vigor to win, but with enough apparent vigor to
mask its intention to lose. The employer has reason to believe that the
union is not determined to win the case and knows the reasons why. The
arbitrator denies the grievance. The decision is "final and binding." Sexist
male workers are satisfied. The union is satisfied that its core constituency
is satisfied. The employer is satisfied with the result. W is either unaware
of the union's lack of a full effort on her behalf, or is aware of both it and
the nearly insurmountable obstacles standing in the way of proving it. No
breach of the duty of fair representation action is filed against the union. 3
B.

ClassifyingSexual HarassmentIssues

One way to view the grievance-handling conflict in its sharpest
contours is to classify various kinds of sexual harassment claims. One can
then identify the sexual harassment claim in which the case for conflict is
demonstrably stronger than it might be in other cases. For example, a case
involving an accused harasser who is a supervisor or manager would not

33. Professor Feller has commented on the potential conflict between a union's
collective responsibilities and an individual's federal statutory rights. He argues that the
conflict is not necessarily present, "particularly where the union has successfully negotiated
a provision fully incorporating statutory rights." Feller, supra note 32, at 77-78. Professor
Feller's reliance on a negotiated statutory rights provision is misplaced because it does not
take the scenario far enough. The collusion potential noted in Gardner-Denverarises at the
stage of implementation of the contractual statutory right, when the union takes to
arbitration a statutory discrimination claim in a setting where the union has complete control
over how a case is presented to an arbitrator. In overwhelming numbers, no doubt, unions
would vigorously and in good faith pursue an individual's statutory claim in the grievance
arbitration forum. The potential for the noted conflict should be avoided, even if only one
union might follow the hypothetical scenario.

1999]

SEXUAL HARASSMENT GRIEVANCES

create conflict problems for the union. At least in the private sector, neither34
a supervisor nor a manager could be a member of a union bargaining unit.
The union could pursue the sexual harassment victim's grievance without
the possibility of a conflict with another bargaining unit member's
interests. The kind of conflict illustrated by the hypothetical cases is
certainly avoidable if the alleged harasser is not a bargaining unit member
but a supervisor or manager who is charged with quid pro quo harassment.
The quid pro quo claim involves a demand for sexual favors in exchange
for good treatment on the job, or to avoid poor treatment on the job.
In contrast, the union's internal conflict might be unavoidable if the
alleged harassment is not quid pro quo, but is instead hostile environment
harassment by a co-employee member of the bargaining unit.35 Because
bargaining unit non-supervisors are more likely than non-bargaining unit
supervisors and managers to engage in hostile environment sexual
harassment, the potential for inter-employee conflict and the union's
entrapment in its crossfire is heightened in hostile environment cases.
Another factor to be considered in analyzing the potential for interemployee conflict is the lineup of parties in sexual harassment cases. In the
victim's grievance, she and the union together oppose the employer. She
and the union say that the victim was sexually harassed. The employer
says that the victim was not harassed, or, that the victim was harassed but
the employer was not at fault. For the accused's discipline-context
grievance, the victim and the employer are in harmony. Both say that there
was sexual harassment and that the accused was the harasser. The union
and the employer remain at odds in a familiar adversarial relationship:
defending a bargaining unit member against allegations of misconduct
leading to discipline or discharge. It is the difference between the victimemployer harmony (in the disciplined-harasser grievance), and the victimemployer opposition (in the accused-harasser grievance) that creates nearly
irremediable problems of conflict for a union.
C.

Weighing Competing GrievantInterests

In the workplace sexual harassment setting, to whom is the union's
assistance most valuable? To the accused and discharged harasser, or to
the alleged victim of sexual harassment? If the availability of a remedy is
34. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (1978) (defining
employer and employee, respectively, and excluding supervisors from the Act's coverage).
Managers are also excluded from National Labor Relations Act coverage. Sometimes the
exclusion of supervisors is noted in the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Beacon
Journal v. Akron Newspaper Guild, 114 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1997) (overturning arbitration
award that included newly promoted supervisors in bargaining unit in face of explicit
exclusionary clause).
35. See id.
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the criterion, the answer may be easy. The harassment victim may file a
claim, in state or federal court, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act or a comparable state statute. 36 In the private sector, the
discharged harasser has virtually no remedy except through the grievancearbitration process because no federal statute and no state statute, except in
Montana,37 provides a just cause standard for a private sector employee's
dismissal from employment. s
D.

Unique Qualities of HarassmentGrievances
Most employee grievances pit a bargaining unit member against an

36. To the extent that employers require individual employees to waive the right to trial
and accept arbitration instead, the kind of sexual harassment claim typified by the Mary-Joe
hypothetical might be forced to arbitration by the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, as
extended by the Fourth Circuit decision in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc.,
78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). The Austin case held that employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements with discrimination clauses are precluded from bringing statutory
discrimination lawsuits if they have not used the grievance arbitration procedure to seek
relief. See 78 F.3d at 885. But see Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.
1995). Other circuits have reached different results, holding that a union cannot waive an
individual's right to pursue a statutory claim in a judicial forum. See Penny v. United Parcel
Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117
F.3d 519, 526-27 (1lth Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th
Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996). The
issue in these cases involving arbitration under collective bargaining agreements is not the
same as the issue resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver. There, an
employee who was an unsuccessful labor arbitration grievant in a racial discrimination case
was held not to have waived his right subsequently to pursue his statutory discrimination
allegations in federal district court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by first
using arbitration. In the Courts of Appeals decisions noted above, the first attempted forum
was not labor arbitration, as in Gardner-Denver,but a judicial forum. It therefore remains
to be determined whether the Supreme Court will treat labor arbitration as a remedy to be
exhausted before a judicial remedy may be sought for a statutory claim. The idea that a
union, as distinguished from an individual employee, may waive an employee's right to
judicial relief appears to be extraordinary. Given the almost uniform criticism of Gilmer by
commentators and-albeit sub silentio-by lower federal courts, its extension to a collective
bargaining agreement to which an individual employee, through a third-party beneficiary, is
not a party, seems unwarranted. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:
Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996);
Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth
Circuit'sMisinterpretationof Supreme Court Precedent,2 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J.
123 (1998); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims:
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Donna
Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration of
Statutory AntidiscriminationRights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 386-87 (1997);
but see Wright, supra note 32.
37. See Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901-914
(1987).
38. See Bornstein, supra note 10, at 109, 119.
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employer representative. No inter-employee contest is involved. It is true
that seniority grievances place bargaining unit employees in competition
with each other. However, no grievances do so with the level of emotion
generated by sexual harassment grievances. Seniority grievances pit one
bargaining unit employee against another bargaining unit employee, but
they are not grievances in which competing employees make accusations of
other employee misconduct. Nor are seniority grievances those in which
the grievances are taken to arbitration for a junior employee who is affected
by a union's prosecution of a seniority grievance. Unlike other grievances
normally channeled to the grievance-arbitration process, sexual harassment
claims involve intentional acts of misconduct.
Sexual harassment victims are often emotionally scarred by the
experience. Few other acts of workplace misconduct have as much
potential to adversely affect the quality of work performed by victims of
the misconduct. Sexual harassment also has the distinguishing feature of
being one of a small number of types of workplace misconduct for which
an employer can be found in violation of a statute carrying potentially
heavy monetary penalties. Employers constantly remind arbitrators of this
by raising the dubious argument in disciplined-harasser grievances that to
reinstate the grievant would place the employer in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, because it is the employer's obligation under Title VII
to rid its workplace of those contributing to an environment of
harassment. 39 This aspect of victim-based sexual harassment claims further
distinguishes them from other grievances that implicate no more than a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The labor arbitrator
ordinarily interprets collective bargaining agreement clauses as having no
statutory implications. In the victim-based sexual harassment setting,
however, the interpreted sexual harassment clause, whether explicit or
derived from a sexual discrimination clause, may also answer the question
of whether the employer has violated state law, federal law, or both. Thus,
the question is posed as to whether a labor arbitrator might be more
reluctant to find that the employer engaged in particular conduct if that
conduct would have violated a federal or state statute under which large
remedial sums are available.

39. Quid pro quo harassment by a supervisor or manager is immediately attributable to
the employer. See Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1997). In cases
alleging hostile environment, an employer is liable only if the employer knew or should
have kmown of the hostile environment. See id. For an excellent analysis of the supervisorstatus issue, see Burnett & Sons, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 743 (1994) (Concepcion, Arb.);
see also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
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E. Screening DisciplinedHarasserGrievances
Among other means, a union operates in the interests of harassment
victims by attempting to limit its defense of accused sexual harassers to
cases in which it is satisfied that an accused harasser was properly accused.
This is the screening process ordinarily associated with grievance
However, the effectiveness of this process in sexual
arbitration.
harassment discipline grievances is questionable. Are unions taking the
wrong cases to arbitration? Published cases suggest that the answer might
be yes. A review of these cases reveals a somewhat disproportionate
number of cases in which the union's position in favor of an accused
harasser was not sustained by the arbitrator. Perhaps even more revealing
than the statistics is the weight of the evidence against the grievant in some
of these cases.
Caution must be exercised here, as societal attitudes concerning the
seriousness of sexual harassment have undergone dramatic changes in the
last ten years. Labor arbitrators seem to have followed the societal trend.
In 1986 and 1987, for example, some arbitrators were sustaining grievances
of disciplined sexual harassers who were found to have engaged in what
would today be regarded as high-level harassment activity. In a 1987 case,
Boys Market v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 770,40 the
grievant had moved his fingers in an upward motion between a female
employee's buttocks. In a 1986 case, Sugardale Foods, Inc. v. Local 17A
United Food and Commercial Workers,4 1 the grievant was discharged for
touching a woman's crotch area. Arbitrators reinstated both grievants.
Also, in the early and middle 1980s, some arbitrators tended to accept
mitigating circumstances arguments made in explanation of a discharged
grievant's admittedly harassing conduct. In AFG Industries, Inc. v.
Aluminum, Brick, and Glass Workers International Union,42 a 1985
decision, the arbitrator reinstated a grievant who, while at a company
outing, threw beer on a female employee, broke one of her wrists, and
sprained the other. The arbitrator reinstated the grievant on the ground that
the company had failed to provide adequate supervision of employees,
especially in light of the presence of alcoholic beverages. Toward the end
of the 1980s, in a 1989 case, GTE Floridav. InternationalBrotherhoodof
Electrical Workers, Local 824,43 an arbitrator reinstated an employee who
had been discharged for three incidents of sexual harassment which
included: (1) grabbing a female employee, bending her over a table and
nuzzling her neck; (2) telling a female employee that the grievant was
40.
41.
42.
43.

88 Lab. Arb.
86 Lab. Arb.
87 Lab. Arb.
92 Lab. Arb.

Rep. (BNA)
Rep. (BNA)
Rep. (BNA)
Rep. (BNA)

1304
1017
1160
1090

(1987)
(1986)
(1985)
(1989)

(Wilmoth, Arb.).
(Duda, Arb.).
(Clarke, Arb.).
(Cohen, Arb.).
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enticed by her appearance; and (3) telling a female employee, "You make
my tongue hard." Recently decided labor arbitration cases suggest that
arbitrators would likely reach different conclusions44 now and would likely
sustain discharges in cases presenting similar facts.
Courts seem to review arbitrators' sexual harassment decisions with
stricter scrutiny than that usually given to final and binding arbitration
decisions. In addition, arbitration decisions in sexual harassment cases are
more likely to be set aside than in other cases. 45 Interestingly, in most of
the decisions that were set aside, the arbitrator decided in favor of the
accused harassers in spite of strong evidence of serious harassing conduct.
Arbitrators would do well to follow the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, and they are
increasingly doing so. The Guidelines provide:
[U]nwelcome, intentional touching of a female worker's intimate
body areas is sufficiently offensive to alter the conditions of her
working environment and constitute a violation of Title VII.
More so than in the case of verbal advances or remarks, a single
unwelcome physical advance can seriously poison the victim's
working environment. 46
Although the Guidelines are not the equivalent of a statute, courts rely on
them as an accurate interpretation of Title VII. 47
44. See, e.g., Metropolitan Transit Comm. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005,
106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 360 (1996) (Imes, Arb.) ("[it cannot be argued that employees
do not know that what once may have been considered 'horseplay' or 'shop talk' may easily
be perceived as sexual harassment in the workplace and that such conduct is no longer
acceptable."); International Mill Serv. v. United Steelworkers of Am. Dist. 34, 104 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 779 (1995) (Marino, Arb.) (sustaining discharge of 15-year employee with
no prior disciplinary action); Safeway, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 588, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 718 (1995) (Goldberg, Arb.) (stating that progressive
discipline need not be applied in case of serious sexual harassment); Superior Coffee and
Foods v. Wholesale, Delivery Drivers, Salespersons, Indus. and Allied Workers Local 848,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 609 (1994) (Alleyne, Arb.) (noting shift
in societal mores concerning sexual harassment).
45. See, e.g., Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d
1436 (3d Cir. 1992); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1990). Other courts have sustained labor arbitrators' decisions on finality grounds,
even though the arbitrators decided in favor of employees who were disciplined for proven
serious sexually harassing conduct. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union
Allied Indus. Workers, 909 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1990); Communication Workers of Am. v.
Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Jeffrey Sarles, The Case
of the Missing Woman: Sexual Harassmentand JudicialReview of ArbitrationAwards, 17
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (1994). Sarles argues that the public policy exception to the
finality of labor arbitration awards, as implied by the Supreme Court in Misco, should apply
to sexual harassment cases. See id. at 39-55.
46. EEOC Policy Guidance: Sexual Harassment, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), at
N:4001, N:4016 (Oct. 25, 1988).
47. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988); Chevron, U.S.A.,
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Multi-PartyMediation

Some sexual harassment victims seek no more than an
acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the perpetrator and a promise by the
employer that it will prevent the harassment from happening again. In
these cases, labor arbitration can provide an adequate remedy. However,
many serious allegations of sexual harassment accompanied by a claim for
substantial monetary relief are best resolved by mediator-assisted
negotiations, possibly initiated at the union's request. Mediation of
employment controversies is no longer limited to negotiations over contract
terms. Modern mediation extends to individual adversarial disputes,
including those in the grievance arbitration hierarchy. 4s
The employer, the union, the alleged harasser, and the alleged victim
would be parties to the mediator-assisted negotiations. Questions to be
resolved include that of the accused harasser's possible guilt, and whether,
as part of any settlement, he should be disciplined in concurrence with the
union, which would include a promise that the union would not support any
future grievances filed by the disciplined employee. A range of possible
disciplinary actions is possible, including the accused harasser's retention
on a "last-chance basis," sometimes conditioned in part on his willingness
to seek counseling for what might be an underlying reason for his harassing
behavior.
The mediator could do much to temper the expectations of all parties
and remind each of the seriousness of a potential lawsuit and the possibility
of loss that accompanies a trial or arbitration. Mediation also has the
advantage of embracing all parties to a harassment dispute, including the
accused harasser, in contrast with the grievance arbitration process which
cannot accommodate a single, consolidated multiparty proceeding. For
example, the kind of interested-party intervention allowed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in federal civil trials49 is unknown in labor
arbitration. Parties to the collective bargaining agreement mutually decide
which procedures will govern the labor arbitration process, and it is seldom
in the interests of either side to permit third-party intervention of any kind.
Minor harassment claims would also benefit from an attempt to reach
a negotiated settlement with the assistance of a mediator. Mediatorassisted negotiations could be a first, and perhaps last, dispute resolution
step. The process would differ from that used for major harassment claims,
however, in that labor arbitration would be used to resolve minor
harassment claims if the dispute was not resolved by mediator-assisted
negotiations. Major harassment claims would move to trial (and perhaps
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. See LINDA R. SINGER, SEn'SING DISPuTEs 98-109 (1990).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
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further court-related settlement efforts) if multi-party mediation efforts
were not successful.
Unions and employers who want to formalize mediation procedures
for sexual harassment claims would probably join in the adoption of
preventive-maintenance measures designed to discourage sexual
harassment. These measures might include jointly sponsored sexual
harassment sensitivity training, education on sexual harassment law, and
jointly structured sexual harassment monitoring groups designed to identify
and remedy early patterns of unlawful harassment, to which initial
complaints of harassment could also be taken for informal resolution.
III. CONCLUSION

The resolution of conflicting grievances related to sexual harassment
issues presents a complex dilemma for unions.
This problem is
compounded by a failure to recognize and acknowledge the potential for
inter-employee conflict that is generated by a union's duty to represent all
bargaining unit members. It is overly simplistic to view the conflict simply
as evidence of union insensitivity to the interests of female union members.
As this Article has sought to demonstrate, victim-based sexual
harassment cases are unlike the grievances ordinarily addressed through the
arbitration process. Unlike other grievances, which can only be resolved
through arbitration, sexual harassment grievances can be remedied by
judicial action. The informalities and esoteric culture of the labor
arbitration forum make it ill-suited to address the kind of serious
allegations of employee misconduct involved in sexual harassment claims.
Sexual harassment claimants should avoid the labor arbitration forum for
all but very minor claims.

